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IN THE SUPREME C·OURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff arnd Appellant, 
-vs.-
T. C. JACKSON and RUBY G. 
JACKSON, his wife, CHARLES Case No. 7896 
E. DAVEY, and JANE DOE 
DAVEY, whose true name is un-
kno,vn, RALPH M. DAVEY, and 
BETH S. DAVEY, his wife, et al. .. 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts made by appellant is sub-
stantially correct. There are some few points of differ-
ence which will be treated at the appToprhite places in 
the argument. 
·. STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
PENDER MUST SHOW HE TOOK POSSESSION AND 
THAT THE SAME WAS CONTINUOUS, HOSTILE, OPEN, 
NOTORIOUS AND EXCLUSIVE. 
POINT II 
PENDER NEVER TOOK POSSESSION. 
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POINT III 
CASUAL OCCASIONAL TRESPASSES CANNOT BE 
USED TO BASE A CLAIM FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
POINT IV 
THE DOCTRINE OF DAY VS. STEELE PRECLUDES 
RECOVE.RY BY APPELLANT. 
POINT. V 
PENDER DID NOT OCCUPY THE LAND CONTINU-
OUSLY NOR HOSTILELY NOR OPENLY NOR EXCLU-
SIVELY NOR NOTORIOUSLY. 
POINT VI 
DISCUSSION OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT 
THE RULE OF TELONIS VS. STALEY SHOULD BE 
ABROGATED. 
POINT VII 
. ABANDONMENT OF TELONIS RULE WOULD NOT 
HELP APPELLANT. BECAUSE ASSESSMENT WAS 
AGAINST DAVEY, ET AL., WITHOUT NAMING THE 
OTHER ·oWNERS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PENDER MUST SHOW HE TOOK POSSESSION AND 
THAT THE SAME WAS CONTINUOUS, HOSTILE·, OPEN, 
NOTORIOUS AND EXCLUSIVE. 
"To acquire title by adverse possession, there-
fore, unde~r our statute, the poss.ession must not 
only be continuous for the time prescribed, but, 
· under well-settled law, must be 'actual, open, and 
notorious, with an· intention on the part of the 
claimant to claim the title as owner, and against 
· the rights of the true owner; * * *." Dignan et al 
v. Nelson et al, 26 U. 186, 72 P. 936~ 
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POINT II 
PENDER NEVER TOOK POSSESSION. 
ContrarY to the state1nent of counsel (Appellant's 
•' 
Brief page 6) w·herein he says: ~·It is patently evident 
and not controverted (Rec. 17-19, 45-52) that app·ellant 
took possession of the ground . . . ", it is controverted 
that appellant ever took possession and it is also contro-
verted that he held it for seven years. Section 104-12-7 
of Chapter 58 Session Laws of Utah 1951 provi~es: 
"In every action for the recovery of real prop-
erty, or the possession thereof, the pe·rson estab-
lishing a legal title to the property shall be pre-
sumed to have been possessed thereof .within the 
time required by law; and the occupation of the 
property by any. other person shall he de·emed 
to have been under and in subordination to the 
legal title, unless it appears· that the p·roperty 
has been held and possessed adversely to such 
legal title for seven years before the commence-
ment of the action." 
There is some relaxation of the requirement for 
physical possession of the whole tract when the property 
is held under a written instrument (S.ec. 104-12-8, same 
Laws). But the reqUirements for obtaining possession 
under a written instrument is also circumscribed by stat-
ute. Section 104-12-9 of the same chapter and laws pro-
vides: 
"For the purpose of constituting an adverse 
possession by any person claiming a title founded 
upon a written instrument or a judgment or de-
cree, land is deemed to have been possessed and 
occupied in the following cases: 
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(1) Where it has been usually cultivated 
or improved. 
(2) Where it has been p-rotected by a sub-
stantial inclosure.. 
( 3) Where, although not inclosed, it has 
been used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing 
timber for the purpose of husbandry, or for pas-
turage or for the ordinary use of the occupant. 
( 4) Where a known farm or single lot has 
been partly improved, the portion of such farm 
or lot that may have been left not cleared or not 
·inclosed according to the usual course and cus-
tom of the adjoining county is deemed to have 
been occupied for the same length of time as the 
part.improved. and cultivated." 
Now the only cultivation of the property was a disk-
ing which was given the property in 1949. ·so it can't be 
claimed that the p-rope.rty was cultivated for seven years 
to qualify under 104-12-9 (1). It is not cl~med that the 
property has been improved, so that disposes of all of 
subparagraph ( 1) . 
It is not claimed that the property has been fenced 
(Tr. 51, lines 2:6 and 27), so subparag:r;aph (2) should be 
eliminated as a basis for claiming adverse pos-session. 
As to subp:aragraph (3), this is vacant land and there 
is no evidence of Pender having used the property to 
supply fuel or fencing timber. Nor is there any evidence 
of its use for pasturage. This leaves only the· use "for 
the ordinary use of the occupant." This will be con-
sidered below. 
The provisions of subparagraph ( 4) ~eems equally 
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inap.plieable in the absence of any evidence to substanti-
ate such a claim. 
N o'v returning to the only p:art of Section 104-12-9 of 
which no disposition was made, was the land occupied 
~·for the ordinary use of the occupant"~ It is argued 
that the ordinary use that the plaintiff and appel-
lant makes of the land he buys is for "investment, rental 
or speculative venture" (Ap·pellant's brief, middle of page. 
·11). But this is the p·urpose for which the land is held, 
not the use made. of it. If the purpose of holding was 
equivalent to use, a tax title p:urchaser would ne:ver need 
to go on the land to make good his claim to adverse pos-
session. 
Using land, which was chiefly valuable for farming 
and grazing, for pasturage has been held to be possession 
for the ordinary use. (Adams vs. LamicqJ ______ U. ______ , 221 
P. 2d 1037). 
What would be an ordinary use of this land~ Appel-
lant thought . that· farming would be such a use,, for he 
says that is one of the things he contemplated. He testi-
fied that in 1941 he thought about plowing the property 
but he didn't do it (Tr. 45, line 24). In 1943 he thought 
he might put in a garden ( Tr. 46, line 2·2) . In 1944 he 
thought of various crops he could p·ut in (Tr. 47, line 4). 
In 1945 he thought of putting in corn ( Tr. 4 7, line 17), and 
in 1949 he thought about farming it again and actually 
disked p'art of rt ( Tr. 50, line 8). But he never farmed the 
land nor did any of those things except to disc the prop-
erty in 1949, two years before commencing suit. 
There are store buildings a few rods to the west of 
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the tract in question, but on to our .land he neither moved 
nor built a store or home. He didn't even fence th~ prop-
erty. That is a statutory method of which he, with his 
· wide knowledge of claiming adverse possession under tax 
titles, doubtless knew. But he didn't choose to fence the 
property. Was it because that would have been too o~ 
vious that he might try_ to ·claim adverse posses~ion ~ Did 
he, with all his experience as a tax title purchaser, feel 
that by being less obvious he might be able to successfully 
claim title by adverse possession without letting the 
owner know that he, the appellant, was claiming posses-
sion~ 
POINT III 
CASUAL AND OCCASIONAL TRESPASSES CAN-
NOT BE-USED TO BASE A CLAIM FOR ADVERSE POS-
SESSION. 
"To ripen into title, it is necessary that an 
adverse claimant's posses-sion ope-rate as an ouster 
of the possession of the true owner. 1 Am. Jur. 
Sec. 142 (page 875).; Strauss vs. Canty, 169 Cal. 
101, 145 P. 1012." Adams ·vs. Lamicq, ______ U. ______ , 
221 P. 2d 1037, 1040; Bingham Livery & Trwnsfer 
Oomparny vs. McDonald, 37 U. '457, 110 P. 56. 
Can it be said that the annual and fleeting visit of 
appellant to post a s'mall card-board sign on a tree hack 
of the property, was such a possession as to "operate 
as an ouster of the possession of the true owners"~ Re-
s.pondent R'Blph Davey testified that although he visited 
the property frequently, he found only one sign on the 
tree st~p, and that was in 1949 (Tr. 80, line 29). Sup-
p~ose he had seen in 1940 or 1941 appellant in possession 
or had otherwise gotten the idea that, though appellant 
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had an invalid ta..-x. title, he 'vas going to try to claim title 
by adverse possession. Let us further sup,pose that this 
was oil land or otherwise of .great value so ,as to warrant 
the posting of a guard on the property on a twenty-four· , 
hour a day basis, 365 days a year, so as to promptly 
evict appellant and all other trespassers, would Davey 
have had any assurance that his guard would have caught 
appellant when he ~ade his annual visit to the.prop·erty~ 
The guard could have gone to the nearby store for. a 
package of cigarettes and have lost the op,portunity to 
evict Mr. Pender, so fleeting were his visits. 
It is not the casual or occasional tresp~ass, and cer-
tainly not a . mere annual visit, which. operates as an 
ouster of the posses-sion of the owner. Under Section 
104-12-7, Chapter.. 58, Session Laws of Utah 1951, the 
pos-session of . the tract is p·resumed to he in the re·al· 
owner unless the adve·rse claimant has "held and pos ... 
sessed adversely to such legal .title for seven years." 
Appellant never took possession of the land, let alone 
held it adversely for seven years.· At most he merely 
trespassed ·on the land briefly once each ye:ar for ten 
years. 
POINT IV 
THE DOCTRINE OF DAY VS. STEELE PRECLUDES 
RECOVERY BY APPELLANT. 
In the case of Day vs. St-eele, ( 111 U. 481, 184 P~ 2d 
216) the tax title claimant paid the. taxes and allowed 
someone to place a commercial sign on the p-roperty and 
permitted still another party to store junk on a part 
of the land and allowed a carnival to occupy it for a week. 
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·He had the property surveyed and put in corner posts 
and later replaced the same when removed. He had a 
water mete:r put in the street for future connection. He 
allowed the dumping of dirt on the land, did some level-
ing of it, and a few days each year the claimant grubbed 
at the weeds and greasewood, and the last year he moved 
a small building on the property. He and many others 
crossed. the land frequently. This was. held to be insuffi-
cient to show possession. · In discussing the sufficiency 
of the leveling of the ground, etc., as ·an improvement, 
this court said in part: 
"In the instant case although there was a 
slight leveling of a sm·all portion of the property 
claimed by adverse .possession it was not done to 
an extent that was noticeable. The weeding wa3 
done in such a manner that the weeds soon flour-
ished again, and the dumping of the few loads of 
'dirt on the grounds did not change its appearance 
or enhance its usefulness as property upon which 
a business could be located. Under such circum-
stances we are of the opinion that the property 
was not improved in the manner usual to improve 
that kind -and character of land for the uses to 
which rt could be put. It is true a building was 
placed on the property a few months before appel-
lant instituted this suit, but even though this is 
cleai"ly an 'improvement,' it is apparent that it 
has not been there a sufficient length of time, nor 
that preliminary work for its placement had been 
done for the statutory period. Day vs. Steele, 111 
U. 481, 184 P. 2d 216, 219." 
· Then the court discusses the matter of whether the 
claimant ever took possession of the land. After observ-
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ing that this \vas vacant property in the city of Delta tLHl 
that the party vvho stored his junk on this lot did like-
wise with other vacant property in the vicinity and that 
the carnival also used near,ly vacant lots, this court ob-
served that "these acts were not of unequivocal character 
indicating ownership ... ", and then went on to say: 
"Not only from the nature .of the use were 
the acts not calculate·d to give notice that someone 
vvas claiming to use·the land as a matter of right 
by reason of ownership, but the uses did not con-
tinue for the statutory length of time. Rather the 
length and type of use was more in the nature of 
trespassers using vacant lots for dumping· and 
other purposes. Many persons used these lots a3 
a shortcut from one street to another. The lots 
were also used as a camping ground by strangers 
without permission from ·anyone. Under such 
conditions we are of the opinion that respondents 
have failed to prove that their possession was 
continuous, hostile, open, notorious and exclusive, 
and of such a character as to give. notice. to the 
owner and the world that it was being held ad-
versely and under claim of ownership."· (Day vs . 
. Steele, 111 U. 481, 184 P. 2d 216, 219.) 
In D. H. Perry Estate vs. Ford, 46 U. 436, 151 P. 59, 
65, the court, by Chief Justice Straup, said: 
"As stated by Mr. Justice Frick, the evidence 
to support the defendant's title by an adverse 
·holding is not strong. I think it weak and insuffi- .. 
cient for this: The defendant's possession and 
occupancy or use of the strip was not of such a 
character as was calculated to give the owner, or 
the world, notice of an adverse holding, and to 
enable the plaintiff, against whom it is claimed to 
·have been exercised, to know about it, and to :2."r:sist 
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the acquisition of the right before the period of 
limitation had run. The strip in dispute was not 
inclosed nor cultivated nor. improved by the de-
fendant. .His possession and occupancy consisted 
principally iri this : He cut a doorway in the south 
side of the shed which abutted the disputed strip 
on the north, and through which he took horses 
in· and out of the shed, and threw manure from the. 
shed, and left wagons stand partly on the strip 
and partly on uninclosed and unoccupied lands to 
the south of the strip. In such manner the defend-
ant used not only the disputed strip, but also, and 
of necessity, so used additional, open, uninclosed, 
and unoccupied ground to the south of the strip,· 
which additional ground confessedly belonged to 
the plaintiff, and admittedly was not acquired 
adversely or otherwise by the defendant. It is not 
uncommon for one neighbor to let vehicles stand 
on uninclosed ·and unoccupied ground of another, 
to lead or drive horses over it; and to throw 
manure and rubbish on it.· All that may be a tres-
pass or a nuisance; but it hardly is such a pos~ses­
sion or occupancy ·as is calculated to give the 
owner notice of an adverse holding, and knowledge 
to him that, if he does not take steps to interrupt 
the occupancy, it will ripen into a title by lilnita-
tion. The chief ground on which a disseisor ac-
quires title by adverse possession is laches of the 
owner, his se~ing his boundary and land invaded 
by an adverse claimant asserting title, and himself 
remaining passive and acquiescing in such ad-
verse claim and asse-rtion. lienee the general rule 
that the possession of an adverse claimant must be 
continuous, exclusive, open, hostile, notorious, and 
of such character as to enable the owner to know 
of the invasion of his rights. I do not think the 
defendant's possession or occupancy or use of the 
strip was of that characte·r." 
10 
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In the case at bar there was no act which would put 
the owner on notice that this tax title clain1an t 'vas at-
tempting to gain title hy adverse p·ossession. He never 
took possession of the land. He never occupied it. 
POINT V 
PENDER DID NOT OCCUPY THE LAND CONT'INtJ~ .· 
OUSLY NOR HOSTILELY NOR OPENLY NOR EXCLU~ 
SIVEL Y NOR NOTORIOUSLY. 
Under the case of Dignan vs. Nelson, 26 U. 186, 72 P. · 
936, quoted supra in Point I, the following steps are 
necessary to show adverse user:. 
"To acquire title· by adverse possession, there-
fore, under our statute, the possession must not 
only be continuous for the time prescribed, but~ 
under well-settled law, must be actual, open, and 
notorious, with an intention on the part of the 
claimant to clain1 the title as owner, and against 
the rights of the true owner; and, in addition to 
all this, the adverse claimant must pay all the 
taxes \Vhich are lawful charges .upon the lan·d." 
(Dignan vs. Nelson, 26 U. 186, 72 P. 936, 937.) 
"To be adverse, so as to vest title after the 
lapse of the statutory period, posses:sion must he 
hostile and under claim of right, actual,. op~en and 
notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninter-:-
. rupted. All of these elements must exist and con-
cur." (2 C.J.s .. , p. 520.) 
Pender's "occupancy'·', if the· fleeting visit could be 
called such, was not continuous but a visit once a year 
(Tr. 45, line 4 et seq., where what claimant did on all 
of his visits, is detailed). Visiting the property annually 
is not continuous possession. No one representing claim-
11. 
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ant was left in charge of the property during the other 
364 days and 23-¥2 hours each year claimant was not 
there. 
Nor was Pender's "occupancy" hostile. He did not 
attempt to keep the owners, the Daveys, off the property. 
Nor was this tax title claimant's "occupancy" open. 
It was just the antithesis of "open". It was sly, stealthy, 
furtive, and secretive. 
If we take Pender's testimony at fUll value, he only 
went there annually at odd times, just long enough to put 
up a little cardboard sign and knock down whatever of' 
last year's weeds might obscure the sign on the stump. 
Nor can it be said that his "occupancy"· was exclu-
sive. There is absolutely no evidence of any attempt on 
Pender's part to keep anyone off the property except a 
protest which he testif~ed he made to the school board, 
which he stated resulted in that board erecting a fence 
between their property and that in dispute. But, aside 
from that testimony, there was no evidence that anyone 
was excluded from the property. It was open to the world 
and all who chose went on it, at their pleasure. Certainly, 
if he had any possession it was no more exclusive than 
that of the claimant who failed in J e.nkins vs. M or goo, 113 
U. 534, 196 P. 2d 871. In fact, appellant's possession was 
even less exclusive because in the Mq~rgan case there was 
only a Mr. Okleberry who grazed the land, while in the 
case :at bar anyone used the· land who cared to do so. 
Nor was there any notoriety about the Pender claim. 
No evidence was shown that his. claim of adverse posse'S-
sion was known to anyone except such as could be de-
12 
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ducted from the fact that he put up little cardboard signs 
back on a stump (which sign was placed so low that it was 
necessary to clean out the w ..eeds so it could he seen). Two 
witnesses SR\V a sign in 1949 or thereafter. Davey saw 
one such sign (Tr. 80, line 29) after March, 1949, 
which he tore .down and destroyed (Tr. 81, line 1 et seq.). 
~Ioroni F·ox, who lived directly across the street from 
the property in litigation and had throughout the peTiod 
in issue· here, saw only one sign on the p·rop~erty and 
that was in 1949, 1950 or 1951 err. 76, line 21 et seq.). 
He passed the property tw~ce daily and frequently sat on 
his porch facing the p·roperty, but that was the only sign 
he 'Saw. 
Mr. Choules, who also resided acros-s. the street and 
saw the property four to six times a day for twenty-two 
years, never saw a single sign (Tr. 58, line 3 et seq.). 
This witness' wife; May H. Choules, who lived op·po-
-site the property -and passed it, walking or riding, very ( 
often for twenty-one years, never saw a sign on the p·rop·-
erty ('Tr. 6·2, line 4 et seq.). 
Mr. William A. Cannon, who lived and had a barber-
shop on 23rd East Street just south of 33rd South Street 
and facing the p·ropeTty, never saw any signs (Tr. 65, 
line 30 et seq.). 
There was just no evidence of notorious user. 
In the absence of any showing that the appellant 
had possession and that the same was continuous, hostile, 
open, notorious., and exclusive, the ap·peal should be dis .. 
missed. 
13 
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POINT VI 
DISCUSSION OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT 
THE RULE OF TELONIS VS. STALEY SHOULD BE 
ABROGATED. 
It is urged that the ·doctrine of Telonis vs. Staley, 
104 U. 537, 144 P. 2d 513, should be overruled. 
The doctrine of that. case, decided in 1943, has ·be-
come firmly established as a part of the law of this state. 
It has ·been cited with approval and followed in thes.e. 
cases: Equit·able Life & Casualty Insurance Compooy 
vs. Schoewe, 105 U. 569, 144 P. 2d 526; Tree vs. White, 
110 U. 233, 171 P. 2d 398, 400; Jenkims vs. Morgan, 113 U. 
534, 196 P. 2d 871, 874; Sperry vs. Tolle.y, 114 U. 303, 199 
P~ 2d 542, 545; Valley~ Investment Companvy vs. Los 
Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Compam;y, ______ U. ______ , 225 
P. 2d 722, 723; Dowse vs. K ammerman, ______ U. ------, 246 
.P. 2d 881, 882. 
To overturn this we·ll established law would throw 
doubt and uncertainty where the rule is now well known 
and is being observed. 
The only ground advanced for such a departure from 
the well established and widely known rule of that case 
and for adventuring into the realms of uncertainty is that 
the California court in Steele vs. San Luis Obispo, 152 
Cal. 785, 93 P. 10~0, did not permit a tax payer to recover 
taxes in proceedings against a taxing unit. That decision 
is not one of this court. Whether this court will follow 
the ruling if the case is presented, is unknown. So the 
argument is that the well established doctrine of Telorllis 
vs. Staley should be reversed because this court might 
14 
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follow the California court if the question presented there 
is ever raised in the State of Utah. Surely such conjec-
.. tures are not the basis for rulings of this court. The 
statute requires these affidavits to be attached to the rolls 
to establish the authenticity thereof. ·This co~urt has re-
peatedly held that the statutory requirement is manda-
tory in order to make a tax sale valid. This well estab-
lished rule should not be abrogated upon the conjecture 
that the court may not be willing to follow the reasoning 
thereof into other fields. 
POINT VII 
ABANDONMENT OF TELONIS RULE WOULD NOT 
HELP APPELLANT BECAUSE ASSESSMENT WAS 
AGAINST "DAVEY, ET AL.," WITHOUT NAMING THE . 
OTHER OWNERS. 
But even if the rule of Telonis vs. Staley was ov.er-
ruled, this would not change the decision below. The as~ 
sessment on which this sale was made was ag~nst "Chas. 
E. Davey, et al." (Tr. 15, lines 14 to 16). The title· at that 
time, according to the abstract, was vested in the follow-
ing persons: Chas. E. Davey, =one-third, Ether M. Davey, 
one-third, and Mary D. Cutler, one-third (Abstract of 
Title, Exhibit ·3, entry 11, showing the fee title was trans-
ferred to all three, which deed, the abstract shows, was 
recorded in Book 42 at page 82, office of the Recorder 
of Salt Lake County, Utah).· Such an assessment was-in-
valid. Section 80-5-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, p·ro~ 
vides: 
"If the name of the owner o·r claimant of any 
property ... ap·pears of record in the office of the 
county recorder where the property is situated, 
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the property must be assessed to such name .... ~' 
In Asp.er vs. Moon, 24 U. 241, 67 P. 409, the record 
title was in "W. H. and H. ·P. Folsom" while the assess-
ment was made to "W. H. Folsom et al." This was held 
to be a non-compliance with the statute and the assess-
ment was held to be void. (Other elements were present 
and the decision was also partially placed on these other 
grounds.) 
In Tintic Undine Mining Compa'IV!J vs. Ercanbrack, 
93 U. 561, 74 P. 2d 1184, this court held that these. require--
ments '9f the statute relative to the names of the oiWllers 
was jurisdictional. 
"The officers who execute this power" (of 
assessment) "should follow the steps outlined for 
its exercise with precision. It is a special juris-
diction and must he strictly pursued. As was said 
in Wister v. Kemmerer, 2 Yeates 100, 'An exact 
and punctual adherence to the laws can alone di-
ve,st the title of lands on a sale for nonpayment of 
taxes.' When the statutes governing the sale of 
lands for taxes direct an act to be done, or the 
manner, time, form, or place of doing it, such act 
must be done as prescribed, and the statutes must 
be strictly, if not literally, complied with. Jungk 
vs. Snyder, 28 Utah 1, 78 P. 168; Moon v. Salt 
Lake County, 27 Utah 435, 76 P. 222; Asper v. 
Moon, 24 Utah 241, 67 P. 409; Bean v. Fairbanks, 
46 Utah 513, 151 P. 338; Hatch vs. Edwards, 72 
Utah 113, 269 P .. 138; Olsen vs. Bagley, 10 Utah 
492, 37 P. 739; Eastman vs. Gurrey, 15 Utah 410, 
49 P. 310." (Tintic Undine Mining. Company vs. 
Ercanbrack, 93 U. 561, 74 P. 2d 1184, 1187.) 
A similar result was arrived at in McCarthy vs. 
Union Pacific Railway C.omparny, 58 Wyo. 308, 131 P. 2d 
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326, where the court invalidated a tax sale based on an 
assessment to ~'Madden Bros." when it should have been 
to Michael S. Madden. 
Certainly in the case at bar, where a deed to Charles 
E. Davey and Mary D. Cutler and Ether M. Davey was 
recorded in 1928 (Exhibit 3, entry 11 of abstract of title), 
a 1934 assessment to "Charles E. Davey, et al," only, 
was invalid under the foregoing authorities. 
For the reasons indicated above, it is respectfully 
submitted that the judgment of the lower court should 
be affirmed and this appeal dismissed. 
IRWIN CLAWSON 
· Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents Davey 
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